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Can the BSGI continue without Russia?

For a long time now I, and those I work with have believed that Snake Island and Türkiye are the key to making the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) work and today seems like a good time to discuss why that is and its implications for what may come next for Ukrainian grain exports via the Black Sea, even if the BSGI deal collapses.


On 24Feb22 Snake Island was attacked by two Russian war ships (the Vasily Bykov and the Moskva) who eventually landed troops and captured the island despite heroic resistance. @CovertShores has been maintaining a list of events. ​​http://www.hisutton.com/Timeline-2022-Ukraine-Invasion-At-Sea.html



This capture was intended to pave the way for Russia to place air defense and other assets on the island to cement their control over the Western Black Sea and specifically the shipping corridor to Odesa.


Snake Island is only 35 kms from the Ukrainian coast and what followed was a series of strategic Ukrainian attacks on the island and resupply efforts by Russia, culminating in a withdrawal of Russian forces on 30Jun22.


In that same February to June period Ukraine struck the Vasily Bykov on 07Mar and the Moskva on 13Apr, only the Moskva sunk. These actions, as well as the sinking of the Saratov on 24Mar and the Vasily Bekov on 17Jun, were the beginning of the Ukrainian Navy regaining control of portions of the Black Sea.


This paved the way for the Black Sea Grain Initiative as now Russia no longer had absolute control of the shipping corridor.


The BSGI worked pretty well, even after Russia attacked the port of Odesa the day after signing. On 29Oct Ukraine used USV’s to attack Sevastopol…


…and Russia in turn pulled out of the BSGI.


While Russia was out of the deal, Putin specifically told Erdogan that Turkish ships would be safe.


More than one analyst at the time interpreted this as weakness on Russia’s part.


Fast forward to Zelensky making a trip to Snake Island to pay his respects.


The weather around that period could have impacted travel and between mines, the Russian Navy and the Russian Air Force that trip was beyond ballsy.


What are the take-aways from Zelensky’s visit?

  • Russia does not have control in the Western Black Sea.

  • Russia may not have been aware of these movements,

  • they were unable to respond in time,

  • they were not confident in their ability to strike

  • or Ukraine sends small boats often enough that it wasn’t out of the ordinary.


On the 500th day of war Türkiye allowed the defenders of Azovstal to return home. The original agreement for their release from Russian captivity reportedly required them to stay in Türkiye for the extent of the war.


Predictably, Russia was really unhappy about the return and they appear not to have been consulted.


During the meetings in Türkiye a number of other agreements were signed including the joint production of UAVs and a strategic industries MOU.

Notably Erdogan also publicly stated that Ukraine should be a member of NATO.


Many have suggested Erdogan has changed sides, I don’t think that’s a reasonable interpretation. Erdogan will always play for Erdogan and if he wants to continue stalling Sweden’s ascension to appease the homefront, this is an alternate step to appeasing the West while growing his economy.


What does it all mean for the BSGI? Russia has been slow-rolling the BSGI for months and I think they have overplayed their hand. It has been 11 days since a new ship has been inspected and that means the month of July will be a write off. They have made the agreement obsolete.


There is no reason for the West to work with Russia to resolve their list of requirements for renewal because the Initiative literally isn’t doing anything. It’s a moot point.


Moreover, everytime the West tries to resolve one of the issues, Russia says “not good enough”. When Ukraine agreed to the @UN’s deal to transit ammonia through the pipeline, Russia blew it up.


When the EU suggested a subsidiary of the Russian Agricultural Bank could be let into SWIFT, Russia said no.


Ukraine has been preparing for this for a long time, starting with their War Risk Insurance legislation.


If I were Ukraine I would continue with inspections of ships and possibly even publicizing cargo data as the BSGI does currently. They have nothing to hide and demonstrating to the world that your economy is viable and open for business is important.


I expect that if Russia pulls out of the BSGI there will be a continuation of some sort but it hinges on Türkiye’s cooperation which is why this meeting was pivotal. It’s not without peril. Even if you can keep the ships safe while at sea there is a risk to the ports of Odesa themselves.


If Russia is not a party to the BSGI any longer there is nothing stopping them from targeting the port facilities other than air defense and we don’t know that Ukraine has enough to mitigate that risk.


There are 8 days left in the Black Sea Grain Initiative and Ukraine has a plan. They have been working hard to demonstrate it is possible. All they need now are some allies who benefit greatly from the deal to put some skin in the game. Erdogan seems poised to do so.


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