To a person, the brilliant folks I have been talking to about a Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) renewal have all asked me “What does Putin get out of the deal?” They aren’t wrong that it is an important factor, so let’s explore.
Hands down, the most important thing he gets is control without the use of force. By agreeing to the Black Sea Grain Initiative we (via UN approval) have collectively said, “We’ll let you keep blockading a country’s ports but they are important to the rest of the world so please can we still use them?” In fact, the name alone is troubling. It implies that it includes all grain shipments through the Black Sea but, as my recent posts have noted, it does not.
We made an agreement with an aggressor state which allows them to inspect ships transiting in and out of a country they invaded and which simultaneously restricts the invaded country’s exports to very select commodities. Specifically, these are very important commodities that the rest of the world relies on to ease starvation and food security issues. Moreover, Russia gains further control because there is no recourse to the significant shipping delays their inspectors are causing.
This sets Russia up in the best possible light. They are cooperating with the international community to fight world hunger in Global South countries and they open exports for their friends, like China, who import the largest portion of the grain from Ukraine. All this while ensuring that exports are limited in type, quantity and value, which restricts the health of the economy of Ukraine.
Russia’s efforts are so effective that wheat tenders for the grains purchased from Russian ports, which almost certainly include grain stolen from occupied territories, are quoted at a higher price than grain from Ukrainian ports. Not only are they controlling the Ukrainian economy but they are helping their economic competitiveness at the same time.
Possibly even more notable is the dissent they are causing in EU countries. In order to diversify export alternatives, Ukraine and the EU have worked together on Solidarity Lanes, expedited rail and road transport of exportable goods from Ukraine to EU ports. The unfortunate part is that, by increasing export of Ukrainian goods (that would normally have gone out by sea) into EU countries, it is dropping the prices EU producers can get for their goods. This breeds frustration and instability in EU countries that are contributing to the Ukrainian war effort and it has the potential to eventually cause elections strife for governing parties. The long term impacts of Russia blocking Ukrainian ports and exports are a national security risk for EU countries.
And fundamentally that’s what Putin gets, significant influence over the Ukrainian economy and partial influence over EU markets, all without having to attack a single ship or otherwise use force in the Black Sea. We didn’t even fight him over it.
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