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1 day ago5 min read

On Empty Rabbit Holes

Frequent readers will note that at the start of last week I said we had been very busy trying to solve some mysteries. The main mystery being that from January 5-7th no ships sailed into the Ukrainian Corridor (UkriCor)1. This fact isn’t unusual, as from time to time weather delays operations of UkriCor and this is especially frequent during the winter storm season which we are currently in. What makes this interruption in inbound ships unusual is that the weather was fine - great even. So why did they stop?


We invested many hours in looking for clues, reaching out to others and generally trying to understand what was happening. One of the posts we came across mentioned an explosion in the neutral waters of the Black Sea on a cargo ship named BLOOM that supposedly was carrying Iranian supplied drones. This piqued our interest.


The post2 was on a Russian Telegram channel and, while it could have been written off as propaganda, it’s important to give leads appropriate consideration until they have been proven  to be untrue. Not everything is propaganda. It appeared to be a screenshot of an article that mentioned a specific ship and details about the consequences of the onboard explosion of one of the drone warheads. Could it be that shipments to Ukrainian ports were paused because of maritime risks due to increased tension from such an explosion? Both the use of cargo vessels for transporting weapons into the Black Sea and any confusion regarding the nature of an explosion could significantly raise tensions by threatening aspects of shipping neither side has been willing to target.


We matched the screenshot to a smaller news publication that covers European politics and that has a website. The website did have other articles that were published on the same date and which had titles and links visible in the screenshot.  However, the article does not appear on the website any longer. There was no record of the article in the Internet Archive either. This implies that if the article was published, then the publication itself opted to take it down and that it was taken down quickly, since the Internet Archive contained snapshots of the publication website from both the day before and the day after the claimed publication date. We tried to reach out to the apparent author of the article on the ship explosion but did not receive a response.


Next we went searching for possible corroboration of the claimed explosion using key details from the text of that screenshot. The most interesting detail was found in a related article3 that made claims of a ship to ship(STS) transfer of Russian weapons that were evacuated from Latakia, Syria on a fishing boat to BLOOM, the cargo ship named in the initial screenshot that caught our attention, a few weeks before the claimed explosion on that same ship. Could this be evidence in support of a cargo ship carrying weapons for Russia, and set up circumstances that make an explosion of one of those weapons more believable?


The first half of this article, containing general details on the situation in Syria, was a direct copy and paste from a Reuters article and we couldn’t locate the claims of the ship to ship transfer in the second half of this article anywhere else. Again, we reached out to the publisher of this second article, but to no avail. 


We asked no less than five other shipping industry sources to look at their data and tell us what they could about the ship. This was made more difficult by the increase in Russian spoofing in the Black Sea area since the start of the new year4. Invariably, every source came back with the same answer; BLOOM had been in a shipyard in Türkiye for some time and no one had data or evidence suggesting it was in the Black Sea, where the screenshot claimed the explosion occurred, since November. Since the Bosphorus Strait is closely monitored, it is difficult to pass into the Black Sea unobserved. 


What of the claim of a STS transfer of Russian weapons to a cargo ship just off the coast of Syria? Again we contacted four accounts who have been posting about and watching Syria closely and especially the maritime traffic there. You may have noticed that most of the coverage has rightfully focused on the Syrian port of Tartus since this is where most of the Russian equipment is waiting to be evacuated5. No one had seen an STS transfer to BLOOM or otherwise consistent with the one we were investigating,  Although there is one STS transfer that @MT_Anderson found which is interesting but not likely related to our story6.


We spent about 15 hours of our time on this project this week and we enlisted the help of numerous accounts and sources who all spent their own time and resources on this one story. This time was on top of our normal daily ship tracking and research into agricultural and Black Sea maritime developments. In the end, we have no proof that any of it happened or that the Telegram post even quoted an actual article. We still remain uncertain as to why there was a multi-day pause in inbound shipping operations.


Research like this can be entirely frustrating because it’s very important to rule out, but it can leave you in the same position you started, with no answers and some important questions. It is however a great example both of the community of people who are willing to help you and of how much effort each of these potential answers take to verify or debunk. There are still some threads to pull on in connection with the two claims above. In addition, we will hold both the unknown shipping interruption and the unverified claims as potential data points that could be proven by further developments or disclosures, and which in turn might help to explain other mysteries that develop. It also demonstrates the spider-web like interconnection of the full scale invasion of Ukraine, in that commercial shipping impacts and is impacted by economics, politics of the Black Sea region, and changes in fortune in distant wars. Ideally, if we had funding, we would have pulled more satellite imagery to help ensure we had all the data possible. Regardless, we’re feeling especially thankful to each of the people we asked for help, you all were amazing!


Why did UkriCor inbound ships stop for three days? We don’t know and we’re still looking. If you have clues we’d love to hear them.



References

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Jul 9, 20234 min read

Can the BSGI continue without Russia?

Updated: 2 days ago

For a long time now I, and those I work with have believed that Snake Island and Türkiye are the key to making the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) work and today seems like a good time to discuss why that is and its implications for what may come next for Ukrainian grain exports via the Black Sea, even if the BSGI deal collapses.


On 24Feb22 Snake Island was attacked by two Russian war ships (the Vasily Bykov and the Moskva) who eventually landed troops and captured the island despite heroic resistance. @CovertShores has been maintaining a list of events. ​​http://www.hisutton.com/Timeline-2022-Ukraine-Invasion-At-Sea.html



This capture was intended to pave the way for Russia to place air defense and other assets on the island to cement their control over the Western Black Sea and specifically the shipping corridor to Odesa.


Snake Island is only 35 kms from the Ukrainian coast and what followed was a series of strategic Ukrainian attacks on the island and resupply efforts by Russia, culminating in a withdrawal of Russian forces on 30Jun22.


In that same February to June period Ukraine struck the Vasily Bykov on 07Mar and the Moskva on 13Apr, only the Moskva sunk. These actions, as well as the sinking of the Saratov on 24Mar and the Vasily Bekov on 17Jun, were the beginning of the Ukrainian Navy regaining control of portions of the Black Sea.


This paved the way for the Black Sea Grain Initiative as now Russia no longer had absolute control of the shipping corridor.


The BSGI worked pretty well, even after Russia attacked the port of Odesa the day after signing. On 29Oct Ukraine used USV’s to attack Sevastopol…


…and Russia in turn pulled out of the BSGI.


While Russia was out of the deal, Putin specifically told Erdogan that Turkish ships would be safe.


More than one analyst at the time interpreted this as weakness on Russia’s part.


Fast forward to Zelensky making a trip to Snake Island to pay his respects.


The weather around that period could have impacted travel and between mines, the Russian Navy and the Russian Air Force that trip was beyond ballsy.


What are the possible take-aways from Zelensky’s visit?

  • Russia does not have control in the Western Black Sea.

  • Russia may not have been aware of these movements,

  • they were unable to respond in time,

  • they were not confident in their ability to strike

  • or Ukraine sends small boats often enough that it wasn’t out of the ordinary.


On the 500th day of war Türkiye allowed the defenders of Azovstal to return home. The original agreement for their release from Russian captivity reportedly required them to stay in Türkiye for the extent of the war.


Predictably, Russia was really unhappy about the return and they appear not to have been consulted.


During the meetings in Türkiye a number of other agreements were signed including the joint production of UAVs and a strategic industries MOU.

Notably Erdogan also publicly stated that Ukraine should be a member of NATO.


Many have suggested Erdogan has changed sides, I don’t think that’s a reasonable interpretation. Erdogan will always play for Erdogan and if he wants to continue stalling Sweden’s ascension to appease the homefront, this is an alternate step to appeasing the West while growing his economy.


What does it all mean for the BSGI? Russia has been slow-rolling the BSGI for months and I think they have overplayed their hand. It has been 11 days since a new ship has been inspected and that means the month of July will be a write off. They have made the agreement obsolete.


There is no reason for the West to work with Russia to resolve their list of requirements for renewal because the Initiative literally isn’t doing anything. It’s a moot point.


Moreover, everytime the West tries to resolve one of the issues, Russia says “not good enough”. When Ukraine agreed to the @UN’s deal to transit ammonia through the pipeline, Russia blew it up.


When the EU suggested a subsidiary of the Russian Agricultural Bank could be let into SWIFT, Russia said no.


Ukraine has been preparing for this for a long time, starting with their War Risk Insurance legislation.


If I were Ukraine I would continue with inspections of ships and possibly even publicizing cargo data as the BSGI does currently. They have nothing to hide and demonstrating to the world that their economy is viable and open for business is important.


I expect that if Russia pulls out of the BSGI there will be a continuation of some sort but it hinges on Türkiye’s cooperation which is why this meeting was pivotal. It’s not without peril. Even if you can keep the ships safe while at sea there is a risk to the ports of Odesa themselves.


If Russia is not a party to the BSGI any longer there is nothing stopping them from targeting the port facilities other than air defense and we don’t know that Ukraine has enough to mitigate that risk.


There are 8 days left in the Black Sea Grain Initiative and Ukraine has a plan. They have been working hard to demonstrate it is possible. All they need now are some allies who benefit greatly from the deal to put some skin in the game. Erdogan seems poised to do so.


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Mar 17, 20232 min read

What does Putin get?

To a person, the brilliant folks I have been talking to about a Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) renewal have all asked me “What does Putin get out of the deal?” They aren’t wrong that it is an important factor, so let’s explore.


Hands down, the most important thing he gets is control without the use of force. By agreeing to the Black Sea Grain Initiative we (via UN approval) have collectively said, “We’ll let you keep blockading a country’s ports but they are important to the rest of the world so please can we still use them?” In fact, the name alone is troubling. It implies that it includes all grain shipments through the Black Sea but, as my recent posts have noted, it does not.


We made an agreement with an aggressor state which allows them to inspect ships transiting in and out of a country they invaded and which simultaneously restricts the invaded country’s exports to very select commodities. Specifically, these are very important commodities that the rest of the world relies on to ease starvation and food security issues. Moreover, Russia gains further control because there is no recourse to the significant shipping delays their inspectors are causing.


This sets Russia up in the best possible light. They are cooperating with the international community to fight world hunger in Global South countries and they open exports for their friends, like China, who import the largest portion of the grain from Ukraine. All this while ensuring that exports are limited in type, quantity and value, which restricts the health of the economy of Ukraine.


Russia’s efforts are so effective that wheat tenders for the grains purchased from Russian ports, which almost certainly include grain stolen from occupied territories, are quoted at a higher price than grain from Ukrainian ports. Not only are they controlling the Ukrainian economy but they are helping their economic competitiveness at the same time.


Possibly even more notable is the dissent they are causing in EU countries. In order to diversify export alternatives, Ukraine and the EU have worked together on Solidarity Lanes, expedited rail and road transport of exportable goods from Ukraine to EU ports. The unfortunate part is that, by increasing export of Ukrainian goods (that would normally have gone out by sea) into EU countries, it is dropping the prices EU producers can get for their goods. This breeds frustration and instability in EU countries that are contributing to the Ukrainian war effort and it has the potential to eventually cause elections strife for governing parties. The long term impacts of Russia blocking Ukrainian ports and exports are a national security risk for EU countries.


And fundamentally that’s what Putin gets, significant influence over the Ukrainian economy and partial influence over EU markets, all without having to attack a single ship or otherwise use force in the Black Sea. We didn’t even fight him over it.

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